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PLAIN MEANING OR PRAGMATICS? 
DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS  
OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT’S 
JURISDICTIONAL PROVISIONS 
NATALIA CABRERA* 
Abstract: There is significant discord among circuit courts over whether a broad 
or narrow construction of the Clean Water Act’s jurisdictional provisions is ap-
propriate in determining when circuit courts should have direct jurisdiction to re-
view petitions challenging regulations. The broad interpretation of these provi-
sions emphasizes the practicality of direct circuit court review of a wider range of 
regulations, whereas the narrow interpretation uses the plain language. In Friends 
of the Everglades v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit addressed this issue as applied to petitions for 
review of the “water transfer rule.” Adopting the plain language approach, the 
court held it did not have jurisdiction to review the petition because the chal-
lenged regulation was not within the jurisdictional provisions. The Supreme 
Court denied certiorari. This Comment notes that both approaches can benefit the 
environment but argues that the long-term implications of the plain language ap-
proach could be detrimental due to judicial inefficiency and a lack of consistent 
application of the law across districts. 
INTRODUCTION 
For centuries, fresh water in Everglades National Park flowed from Lake 
Okeechobee to the Florida Bay every year during the wet season.1 Now, pollu-
tion in Lake Okeechobee from surrounding agriculture overflows through the 
Everglades along with the fresh water.2 
The South Florida Water Management District (“Water District”) is a re-
gional government agency responsible for managing and protecting the water 
resources of South Florida.3 Everglades restoration is currently a major initia-
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2013–2014. 
 1 Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. United States, 566 F.3d 1257, 1261 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 2 Friends of the Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 3 About Us, S. FLA. WATER MGMT. DIST., http://www.sfwmd.gov/portal/page/portal/xweb%20
about%20us/sfwmd%20about%20us (last visited Oct. 14, 2013), available at http://perma.cc/3HWX-
8PT3. 
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tive for the Water District,4 which cooperates with the EPA to develop strate-
gies for improving water quality in the Everglades.5 
Friends of the Everglades is a non-profit organization that sues to enforce 
laws that preserve the ecosystems of the Everglades when the organization 
concludes that the state or federal government has failed to provide such pro-
tection.6 When such an entity challenges an agency action directly, a court 
must first establish whether it has jurisdiction based on provisions in the rele-
vant statute before addressing the merits of the petition.7 
Circuit courts have developed two conflicting approaches to determining 
when agency actions can be challenged directly at their level.8 The U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Friends of the Everglades v. U.S. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency adopted an approach that emphasizes the plain 
meaning of the Clean Water Act’s (CWA) jurisdictional provisions, while other 
circuit courts focus on the pragmatic application of the purpose of these provi-
sions.9 This Comment argues that these approaches are in sufficient conflict to 
have merited certiorari to the Supreme Court and that the plain meaning ap-
proach could have detrimental long-term environmental impacts despite posi-
tive short-term effects.10 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Lake Okeechobee is located in southern Florida, just north of the Ever-
glades Agricultural Area, which consists of canals created by the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers to collect rainwater and runoff from nearby industrial and 
residential areas.11 The water held in these canals contains chemical contami-
                                                                                                                           
 4 Id. 
 5 Restoration Strategies for Clean Water for the Everglades, S. FLA. WATER MGMT. DIST., http://
www.sfwmd.gov/portal/page/portal/xweb%20protecting%20and%20restoring/restoration%20strategies 
(last visited Jan. 23, 2014), available at http://perma.cc/9TB4-DQWS. 
 6 Legal Actions: Why Is Friends of the Everglades Involved in Legal Actions?, FRIENDS OF THE 
EVERGLADES, http://www.everglades.org/our-legal-action/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2013), available at 
http://perma.cc/9NJ7-UTG5. 
 7 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012) (providing for judicial review of agency action in federal district 
courts); 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) (2006) (providing for judicial review of agency actions in federal 
circuit courts). 
 8 See Bill Funk, Government Seeks Certiorari on Clean Water Act’s Direct Review Provision in 
EPA v. Friends of the Everglades, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM (July 17, 2013), http://www.
progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=ED5518EC-E84F-F750-45DC57EB23CABC94, avail-
able at http://perma.cc/5D35-JVYQ. 
 9 Friends of the Everglades v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 699 F.3d 1280, 1283 (11th Cir. 2012); see 
Natural Res. Def. Council, v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 673 F.2d 400, 404 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
 10 See Estie Manchik, Note, Friends of the Earth v. United States Environmental Protection Agen-
cy: A Battle for the Proper Forum to Protect the Nation’s “Forgotten River,” 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 531, 
559–60 (2004). 
 11 S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d at 1214. 
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nants, suspended and dissolved solids, and low levels of dissolved oxygen.12 
The Water District operates three pumping stations that pump water from the 
lower levels of the canals into the higher waters of Lake Okeechobee.13 Alt-
hough no additional materials are added to the canal water through this pro-
cess, the contaminants already in the water from the canals are not removed 
before the water is deposited in the lake.14 
On April 8, 2002, Friends of the Everglades and Fishermen Against the 
Destruction of the Environment sued the Water District in the U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of Florida.15 The organizations sought to enjoin 
the Water District from back-pumping contaminated water into the lake with-
out first obtaining a permit under the National Pollution Discharge Elimination 
System (NPDES) of the CWA.16 
The district court held in favor of the plaintiffs, but before the court en-
tered an injunction, the EPA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking on June 7, 
2006.17 The rule—exempting water transfers from the permitting requirements 
of the CWA18—was finalized on June 13, 2008,19 and thus controlled the result 
of a subsequent appeal in the Eleventh Circuit.20 In applying the newly prom-
ulgated rule, the Eleventh Circuit found in favor of the Water District and re-
versed the decision of the district court.21 
Seeking to invalidate the water transfer rule in a different court,22 the 
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians and several conservation organizations (including 
Friends of the Everglades) petitioned the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York and U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Flori-
da to review the rule.23 Although the petitioners maintained that the district 
                                                                                                                           
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Friends of the Everglades, Inc. v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., No. 02-80309 Civ., 2006 WL 
3635465, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 11, 2006). 
 16 Id. at *2. 
 17 Friends of the Everglades, 699 F.3d at 1284; see National Pollutant Discharge Elimination 
System (NPDES) Water Transfers Proposed Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 32,887 (proposed June 7, 2006) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122). 
 18 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Water Transfers Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 
33,697 (June 13, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122). A water transfer is defined as an “activity 
that conveys or connects waters of the United States without subjecting the transferred water to inter-
vening industrial, municipal, or commercial use.” Friends of the Everglades, 699 F.3d at 1284. 
 19 National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Water Transfers Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 
at 33,697. 
 20 See Friends of the Everglades, 699 F.3d at 1285. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Funk, supra note 8 (explaining that “if [the tribe and conservation organizations] could divest 
the Eleventh Circuit of jurisdiction in favor of district courts, then challenges brought in district courts 
in other circuits might reach a different conclusion as to the validity of the Rule”). 
 23 Friends of the Everglades, 699 F.3d at 1285; Corrected Initial Brief for Friends of the Ever-
glades, Florida Wildlife Federation, Sierra Club, and Environmental Confederation of Southwest Flor-
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courts had jurisdiction, the petitioners filed protective petitions for review with 
both the Second Circuit and Eleventh Circuit.24 The Judicial Panel on Multi-
district Litigation consolidated the two circuit court suits in the Eleventh Cir-
cuit, which resulted in Friends of the Everglades v. U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency.25 The Eleventh Circuit had stayed the petitions while it consid-
ered the water transfer rule in the appeal of the action to enjoin the Water Dis-
trict.26 
The EPA filed a motion for summary denial of the petitions for review, 
and the petitioners filed motions for dismissal and argued that the circuit court 
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.27 The Eleventh Circuit denied all motions 
and required the issues to be determined on the briefings and merits of the 
case.28 
Seeking to defend the water transfer rule, the EPA advocated a practical 
construction of the CWA jurisdictional provision.29 This interpretation would 
allow the Eleventh Circuit to decide on the merits of the case.30 Because the 
Eleventh Circuit recently upheld the water transfer rule in Friends of the Ever-
glades v. South Florida Water Management District,31 the court could again 
uphold the rule in Friends of the Everglades v. U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency if the court determined that it had jurisdiction.32 In contrast, the peti-
                                                                                                                           
ida at 3– 4, Friends of the Everglades, 699 F.3d 1280 (No. 08-13652) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner]. 
These petitions were brought pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, which allows challenges 
to agency actions in district court. See id. 
 24 Friends of the Everglades, 699 F.3d at 1285; Brief for Petitioner, supra note 23, at 2–3. In filing 
protective petitions for review with the circuit courts, the petitioners here sought only to divest the 
circuit courts of original jurisdiction over direct challenges to an agency action. Funk, supra note 8. 
They argued that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to review the petitions directly because the 
action was not one of those enumerated in the jurisdictional provision of the CWA. Brief for Petition-
er, supra note 23, at 28–29. 
 25 Friends of the Everglades, 699 F.3d at 1285. 
 26 Id. The court upheld the water transfer rule under Chevron deference and reversed the district 
court’s decision granting an injunction. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d. at 1228. 
 27 On Petitions for Review of a Final Rule of the United States Environmental Protection Agency 
at 2, 4–5, Friends of the Everglades, 699 F.3d 1280 (No. 08-13652) (denying various motions). 
 28 Id. at 4–5. 
 29 See Friends of the Everglades, 699 F.3d at 1286; Brief for Respondents at 17, Friends of the 
Everglades, 699 F.3d 1280 (No. 08-13652) (arguing that § 1369(b)(1)(E) should be interpreted as 
incorporating any agency actions “related to” the approval or promulgation of effluent limitations or 
other limitations, and reading “other limitations” to include the water transfer rule). 
 30 See Friends of the Everglades, 699 F.3d at 1286 (discussing the EPA’s interpretation of the 
jurisdictional provision as including the water transfer rule, which would give the circuit court juris-
diction). 
 31 570 F.3d at 1228. 
 32 See id. 
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tioners argued for a strict interpretation of the jurisdictional provision, which 
would give the words of the statute their plain meaning.33 
On October 26, 2012, the Eleventh Circuit held that it did not have origi-
nal jurisdiction to hear direct challenges to the agency action.34 The holding 
relied on the court’s adherence to precedent supporting the stricter interpreta-
tion of the plain language of the CWA.35 This decision conflicted directly with 
National Cotton Council of America v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 
where the court held it had original jurisdiction over review of a similar regula-
tion.36 
On June 28, 2013, the EPA petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of cer-
tiorari to appeal the Eleventh Circuit’s decision.37 On October 15, 2013, the 
Supreme Court denied the petition on the issue of whether the circuit court had 
original jurisdiction under 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) over a petition for review of 
the water transfer rule.38 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Clean Water Act (CWA) of 1972 was enacted to “restore and main-
tain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”39 
In pursuit of this purpose, the CWA makes it unlawful for any person to dis-
charge any pollutant into a navigable water of the United States without a Na-
tional Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit.40 The CWA 
empowers the EPA to issue these permits.41 
                                                                                                                           
 33 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 23, at 29 (arguing that the water transfer rule does not specifi-
cally grant or deny “a permit” and does not constitute a “limitation” on quantities, rates, and concen-
trations of pollutants, or “standards of performance”). 
 34 Friends of the Everglades, 699 F.3d at 1283. 
 35 See id. at 1283, 1287. The court relied on Northwest Environmental Advocates v. U.S. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, 537 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2008), where the Ninth Circuit held that 
§ 1369(b)(1)(E) did not give it jurisdiction because the challenged regulation created a permanent, 
categorical exemption from a permitting requirement, rather than a limitation. Friends of the Ever-
glades, 699 F.3d at 1287. The court found that the water transfer rule similarly served the opposite 
function of a limitation. Id. at 1287. 
 36 See 553 F.3d 927, 933 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding that a permanent exemption to the NPDES per-
mitting program could be considered as regulating permitting procedures and thus governing the issu-
ance or denial of a permit). 
 37 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Friends of the Everglades, 699 F.3d 1280 (No. 13-10); Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency v. Friends of the Everglades, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.
com/case-files/cases/environmental-protection-agency-v-friends-of-the-everglades/ (last visited Nov. 
16, 2013), available at http://perma.cc/Y3RQ-3QFK. 
 38 Environmental Protection Agency v. Friends of the Everglades, supra note 37. 
 39 Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2006). 
 40 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (“Except as in compliance with this section and sections 1312, 1316, 1317, 
1328, 1342, and 1344 of this title, the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful”). 
 41 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (giving the EPA Administrator authority to issue permits for pollutant 
discharges); id. § 1251(d) (giving the EPA Administrator power to administer the Clean Water Act). 
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To implement the permitting provisions, the EPA has broad authority to 
“prepare or develop comprehensive programs for preventing, reducing, or 
eliminating the pollution of the navigable waters.”42 Using this authority, the 
EPA has promulgated regulations creating permanent exemptions to the re-
quirement to obtain a NPDES permit.43 
The “water transfer rule” is one such regulation, and it permanently ex-
empts any discharge constituting a “water transfer” from NPDES permitting 
requirements.44 A water transfer is an activity that “conveys or connects waters 
of the United States without subjecting the transferred water to intervening 
industrial, municipal, or commercial use.”45 The rule specifies that the circuit 
courts have jurisdiction over challenges.46 
Specific provisions of the CWA grant jurisdiction to the circuit courts to 
review enumerated agency actions directly.47 If an agency action is not among 
the listed actions, however, the district courts have jurisdiction under the gen-
eral federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, in conjunction with the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act (APA).48 
In Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, the Supreme Court in 1980 ad-
dressed whether the jurisdictional provision of the CWA included the EPA ac-
tion of vetoing state-proposed NPDES permits.49 The Supreme Court held that 
it did because vetoing a state NPDES permit was “functionally similar” to 
denying a permit, which is specifically included in the provision.50 
                                                                                                                           
 42 Id. § 1252(a); Friends of the Everglades v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 699 F.3d 1280, 1284 (11th 
Cir. 2012). 
 43 Friends of the Everglades, 699 F.3d at 1284. 
 44 See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Water Transfers Rule, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 33,697 (June 13, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122). 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(E)–(F) (2006). Section 1369(b)(1)(E) provides review in the circuit 
courts for actions “approving or promulgating any effluent limitation or other limitation under section 
1311, 1312, 1316, or 1345.” Section 1369(b)(1)(F) applies to actions “in issuing or denying any per-
mit under section 1342.” 
 48 Funk, supra note 8; see 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012) (“Agency action made reviewable by statute and 
final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial re-
view.”); 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012). 
 49 445 U.S. 193, 194 (1980); Reply Brief of Friends of the Everglades, Florida Wildlife Federa-
tion, Sierra Club, and Environmental Confederation of Southwest Florida at 7, Friends of the Ever-
glades, 699 F.3d 1280 (No. 08-13652) [hereinafter Reply Brief for Petitioners]. 
 50 Crown Simpson, 445 U.S. at 196. The Supreme Court found jurisdiction under § 1369(b)(1)(F) 
because the EPA’s veto of the state-issued NPDES permit had the “precise effect” of denying a 
NPDES permit. Id. Because denying a NPDES permit is specifically enumerated in § 1369(b)(1)(F), 
the Supreme Court found vetoing a permit to be “functionally similar.” Id. 
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A. Broad, Pragmatic Interpretations of the Jurisdictional Provision 
One year later, in Natural Resources Defense Council v. U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency (“NRDC 1981”), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit addressed a challenge to regulations governing applications for 
variances from limitations on municipal sewage treatment plants.51 The D.C. 
Circuit found that it had jurisdiction under 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(E) of the 
CWA because the action constituted an “effluent limitation.”52 Although the 
regulation did not create a numerical limitation, the court interpreted “effluent 
limitation” broadly to include restricting availability of permits because the 
rule regulated the “underlying permit procedures.”53 
In 1982, the D.C. Circuit again gave § 1369(b)(1) a “practical rather than 
a cramped construction” in Natural Resources Defense Council v. U.S. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (“NRDC 1982”).54 The Consolidated Permit 
Regulations (CPRs) challenged in this case were a complex set of procedures 
for issuing or denying NPDES permits.55 These regulations did not set any 
numeric limitations on pollutant discharges, but the court interpreted the “other 
limitation” language from § 1369(b)(1)(E) broadly.56 It characterized the CPRs 
as “a limitation on point sources and permit issuers” and “a restriction on the 
untrammeled discretion of the industry.”57 
In 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit addressed a chal-
lenge to an agency action permanently exempting a category of discharge from 
the NPDES permitting program in National Cotton Council of America v. U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency.58 There, EPA had created a permitting ex-
emption for pesticides under certain circumstances.59 Applying the reasoning 
of NRDC 1981, the Sixth Circuit found that the revision constituted a “regula-
tion of the underlying permitting procedures.”60 In applying a broader con-
                                                                                                                           
 51 656 F.2d 768, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 52 Id. at 776. 
 53 Id. The D.C. Circuit found “as a practical matter [the regulations] restrict the discharge of sew-
age by limiting the availability of a variance to a class of applicants which does not include all coastal 
municipalities.” Id. at 775. The D.C. Circuit relied on E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 
U.S. 112, 136 (1977), where the Supreme Court avoided creating a “perverse situation” in which a 
circuit court could review the grant or denial of individual permits but could not directly review the 
regulations governing those permits. NRDC 1981, 656 F.2d at 775. 
 54 673 F.2d 400, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
 55 Id. at 402. 
 56 See id. at 403. 
 57 Id. at 405 (quoting Va. Elec. & Power Co. v. Costle, 566 F.2d 446, 450 (4th Cir. 1977)). 
 58 553 F.3d 927, 929 (6th Cir. 2009); see Application of Pesticides to Waters of the United States 
in Compliance with FIFRA, 71 Fed. Reg. 68,483, 68,485 (Nov. 27, 2006) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pt. 122). 
 59 Nat’l Cotton Council of Am., 553 F.3d at 931; Application of Pesticides to Waters of the United 
States in Compliance with FIFRA, 71 Fed. Reg. at 68,485, 68,492. 
 60 Nat’l Cotton Council of Am., 553 F.3d at 933. 
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struction of the jurisdictional provision, National Cotton follows the pragmatic 
approach introduced in Crown Simpson and refined in NRDC 1981 and NRDC 
1982.61 
B. Plain Language Interpretation of the Jurisdictional Provision 
In 2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit interpreted the 
plain language of the jurisdictional provision of the CWA in Northwest Envi-
ronmental Advocates v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.62 There, the 
challenged regulation exempted three categories of discharges from the 
NPDES permitting requirements.63 Declining to read the jurisdictional provi-
sion broadly, the Ninth Circuit determined that categorical exemptions do not 
fit squarely within § 1369(b)(1)(E) or (F).64 The court reasoned that the regula-
tion imposed no “limitation” on discharges because it excluded certain dis-
charges from the requirements of the permitting program and thus removed 
limitations based on the plain meaning of the word.65 Similarly, the rule did not 
constitute an issuance or denial of a permit because it exempted from NPDES 
permitting a class of point sources not found in the CWA.66 
III. ANALYSIS 
In Friends of the Everglades v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that it did not have 
original subject-matter jurisdiction over petitions to review the EPA’s water 
transfer rule, and that the court could not exercise hypothetical jurisdiction.67 
The Eleventh Circuit found that the plain meaning of § 1369(b)(1)(E) and 
                                                                                                                           
 61 See NRDC 1982, 673 F.2d at 403; NRDC 1981, 656 F.2d at 775. 
 62 See 537 F.3d 1006, 1016, 1018 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that judicial review would be available 
in this case only if the language of the CWA is given a “Pickwickian” interpretation). 
 63 Id. at 1011; 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(a) (2013) (excluding various discharges associated with normal 
operation of a vessel from the NPDES permit requirement). 
 64 Nw. Envtl. Advocates, 537 F.3d at 1016, 1018. 
 65 Id. at 1016. The rule therefore did not constitute the approval or promulgation of “any effluent 
limitation or other limitation” and could not fall within § 1369(b)(1)(E). Id. 
 66 Id. at 1018. The rule thus could not fall within § 1369(b)(1)(F) because it was not the issuance 
or denial of a permit. Id. The Ninth Circuit also reasoned from a policy perspective that the “perverse 
situation” present in NRDC 1982 was not applicable because with a permanent exemption to the per-
mitting requirement, an appeals court will never hear challenges to regulations issuing or denying 
individual permits. Id. As a result it will not be “perverse” that the court cannot directly hear petitions 
regarding the overall exemption regulation. Id. 
 67 Friends of the Everglades v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 699 F.3d 1280, 1283 (11th Cir. 2012). 
The U.S. Sugar Corporation advocated for hypothetical jurisdiction, where a court decides a case on 
the merits as if it did have jurisdiction. Id. at 1286. The Eleventh Circuit rejected hypothetical jurisdic-
tion as ultra vires, or beyond the powers of the court, and contradicting Supreme Court precedent. Id. 
at 1288. 
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(F)—the jurisdictional provisions of the Clean Water Act (CWA) implicated in 
this case—could not include the water transfer rule.68 
Regarding § 1369(b)(1)(E), the Eleventh Circuit held that only actions 
that are “effluent limitations” or “other limitations promulgated under section 
1311, 1312, 1316, or 1345” of the CWA could be reviewed directly by the 
court.69 The Eleventh Circuit rejected the EPA Administrator’s argument that 
circuit courts also have jurisdiction over rules “related to” a limitation on 
movements of water.70 The court found that the water transfer rule is not a 
“limitation” because it does not impose any restrictions and instead exempts 
parties from the NPDES permitting program under specific circumstances.71 
The Eleventh Circuit similarly held that it did not have original jurisdic-
tion under § 1369(b)(1)(F) because the water transfer rule “neither issues nor 
denies a permit.”72 The Supreme Court has interpreted this provision to include 
rules that have the “precise effect” of or are “functionally similar” to issuing or 
denying a permit.73 The Eleventh Circuit found that the water transfer rule is 
not functionally similar to issuing or denying a permit.74 
Although the Eleventh Circuit’s holding was consistent with one interpre-
tation of relevant case law, implementing bodies and the public would benefit 
from a Supreme Court decision clarifying the correct approach for circuit 
courts.75 The Eleventh Circuit properly analyzed the principles set out in 
Northwest Environmental Advocates v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
and assessed the water transfer rule to determine that the court does not have 
jurisdiction under CWA § 1369(b)(1)(E) or (F).76 The rule at issue in that case 
provided that three types of discharges did not require NPDES permits.77 Simi-
larly, the water transfer rule creates a permanent exemption from the NPDES 
                                                                                                                           
 68 Id. at 1287, 1288. 
 69 Id.; see 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(E) (2006). 
 70 Friends of the Everglades, 699 F.3d at 1286. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. at 1287; see 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1)(F). 
 73 Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 445 U.S. 193, 196 (1980). 
 74 Friends of the Everglades, 699 F.3d at 1288. In holding that § 1369(b)(1)(F) should not be read 
to include “regulations relating to permitting itself,” the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the Sixth 
Circuit’s decision in National Cotton Council v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 553 F.3d 927 
(6th Cir. 2009). See Friends of the Everglades, 699 F.3d at 1288. The Eleventh Circuit relied on the 
reasoning of Northwest Environmental Advocates v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 537 F.3d 
1006 (9th Cir. 2008), and applied the plain meaning of the statutory text. Friends of the Everglades, 
699 F.3d at 1288. 
 75 See On Petitions for Review of a Final Rule of the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency, supra note 27, at 4; Funk, supra note 8. 
 76 See Friends of the Everglades, 699 F.3d at 1287, 1288; Nw. Envtl. Advocates, 537 F.3d at 1006, 
1015. 
 77 Nw. Envtl. Advocates, 537 F.3d at 1011. 
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permitting program.78 Because the rules at issue are largely functionally equiv-
alent,79 the Eleventh Circuit appropriately applied the reasoning from North-
west Advocates to Friends of the Everglades and found it did not have jurisdic-
tion under § 1369(b)(1)(E) or (F).80 
This holding was consistent with a strict but reasonable interpretation of 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle.81 There, 
the act of vetoing a state NPDES permit was “functionally similar” to a denial 
of a NPDES permit and thus subject to CWA § 1369(b)(1)(F).82 In contrast, the 
Eleventh Circuit found that the water transfer rule was not “functionally simi-
lar” to an issuance or denial of a NPDES permit because it had the effect of 
categorically excluding certain discharges from the permitting program.83 
Based on the specific language of the statute and the facts of Crown Simpson, 
this was a reasonable construction of the jurisdictional provision.84 
A broader interpretation of Crown Simpson arguably could have been rea-
sonable, however, and could have enabled direct circuit court jurisdiction in 
Friends of the Everglades.85 Such an interpretation of the jurisdictional provi-
sion authorizes direct review of any EPA action that regulates underlying per-
mitting procedures,86 including the water transfer rule.87 This reading is con-
sistent with the policy language in both Crown Simpson and Natural Resources 
Defense Council v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“NRDC 1982”).88 
                                                                                                                           
 78 See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Water Transfers Rule, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 33,697 (June 13, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122). 
 79 See id.; Friends of the Everglades, 699 F.3d at 1287–88 (finding that the water transfer rule 
categorically exempts water transfers from NPDES permitting); Nw. Envtl. Advocates, 537 F.3d at 
1011 (finding that the ballast water rule categorically exempts three types of discharges from NPDES 
permitting). 
 80 See Friends of the Everglades, 699 F.3d at 1286–88; Nw. Envtl. Advocates, 537 F.3d at 1015–
16, 1018 (finding that because the specificity and precision of the statute require a narrow interpreta-
tion, the regulation at issue could not be considered an effluent limitation or other limitation, and did 
not involve the issuance or denial of a permit or a functionally similar action). 
 81 See Friends of the Everglades, 699 F.3d at 1288; Crown Simpson, 445 U.S. at 196. 
 82 Crown Simpson, 445 U.S. at 196; Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 49, at 7. 
 83 Friends of the Everglades, 699 F.3d at 1288. 
 84 See id.; Crown Simpson, 445 U.S. at 196 (finding the action of vetoing a state-issued permit 
functionally similar to issuing or denying a permit, because the veto functioned the same as a denial if 
the NPDES permitting program had been overseen by the federal EPA, not the state). 
 85 See Crown Simpson, 445 U.S. at 193; E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 
136 (1977); Nat’l Cotton Council, 553 F.3d at 933; National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES) Water Transfers Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. at 33,697. 
 86 See Nat’l Cotton Council, 553 F.3d at 933; Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agen-
cy, 656 F.2d 768, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 87 See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Water Transfers Rule, 73 Fed. 
Reg. at 33,697. 
 88 See Crown Simpson, 445 U.S. at 196 (reasoning that “vesting jurisdiction in the courts of ap-
peals under § 509(b)(1)(F) would best comport with the congressional goal of ensuring prompt resolu-
tion of challenges to EPA’s actions . . .”); Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 673 
F.2d 400, 405 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“National uniformity, an important goal in dealing with broad 
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Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit in Friends of the Everglades stated this 
was a jurisdictional issue of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit and that 
circuits have differed in approaches.89 Even after the Eleventh Circuit’s deci-
sion in Friends of the Everglades, it remains unclear how other circuits will 
interpret the precedent in the future, and a Supreme Court decision would have 
added clarity and predictability to this issue.90 Because the case law is ambigu-
ous,91 and courts have the option of interpreting § 1369(b)(1)(E) and (F) broad-
ly or narrowly, courts should decide based on efficiency, consistency and cer-
tainty to protect the environment in the long run.92 
Although the denial of certiorari gives environmental groups a second 
chance to argue against the water transfer rule,93 the long-term consequences 
of a precedent against circuit court jurisdiction could be harmful for the envi-
ronment.94 The immediate effect of this case is to divest the Eleventh Circuit of 
jurisdiction over direct petitions challenging the water transfer rule, which ren-
ders the court’s prior decision to uphold the rule ineffective.95 Consequently, 
Friends of the Everglades will likely seek a favorable decision at the district 
court level.96 A decision for Friends of the Everglades in district court could 
strike down the water transfer rule as an arbitrary and capricious regulation, 
which would require a permit for back-pumping polluted water into Lake 
Okeechobee.97 
Despite this positive environmental effect, the more pragmatic approach 
to the provision is more effective at creating positive outcomes in the long-
term.98 Section 1369(b)(1)(E) of the CWA should be interpreted to provide ju-
                                                                                                                           
regulations, is best served by initial review in a court of appeals . . . . [T]he great advantage the district 
courts have over the courts of appeals—their ability to use extensive factfinding mechanisms—is not 
relevant here. There is not even an arguable need to engage in technical factfinding when judi-
cial review is concentrated on an agency record and policy determinations.”). 
 89 On Petitions for Review of a Final Rule of the United States Environmental Protection Agency, 
supra note 27, at 4–5; Brief for Respondents, supra note 29, at 2–3 (citing Nat’l Cotton Council, 553 
F.3d at 932–33 and Nw. Envtl. Advocates, 537 F.3d at 1015–18). 
 90 See Funk, supra note 8; see also Shell Oil Co. v. Train, 415 F. Supp. 70, 75 (D.C. Cal. 1976) 
(quoting Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 526 F.2d 1027, 1074 (1975) (Adams, J., concur-
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 91 On Petitions for Review of a Final Rule of the United States Environmental Protection Agency, 
supra note 27, at 4–5. 
 92 See NRDC 1982, 673 F.2d at 405 n.15; Funk, supra note 8; Manchik, supra note 10, at 555. 
 93 See Funk, supra note 8. 
 94 See NRDC 1982, 673 F.2d at 405 n.15; Jonathan A. Schorr, Note, The Forum for Judicial Re-
view of Administrative Action: Interpreting Special Review Statutes, 63 B.U. L. REV. 765, 793–94 
(1983). 
 95 See Funk, supra note 8. 
 96 See id. 
 97 See id.; National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Water Transfers Rule, 
supra note 18, at 33,697. 
 98 See infra notes 101–115 and accompanying text. 
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risdiction in this case because the water transfer rule regulates underlying per-
mitting procedures.99 The rule exempts a certain category of discharge, just as 
the revision to the regulation in National Cotton Council categorically exempts 
discharges of pesticides.100 
The pragmatic approach would improve efficient decision-making and in-
crease regulatory certainty.101 Efficiency would improve because multiple peti-
tions could be consolidated in one circuit court,102 and circuit courts are more 
competent at reviewing an administrative record than district courts.103 Im-
proved regulatory certainty could follow from the increased efficiency because 
of the expedited review process and the greater uniformity in outcomes.104 
At the district court level, a variety of courts receive petitions challenging 
one agency action, which each district court must review independently.105 Be-
cause petitions may be reviewed by the circuit court on appeal from the district 
court,106 starting the petition process with the circuit court could save time and 
resources.107 When an agency action immediately harms the environment, the 
delay of a final decision on the challenged action could lengthen the period of 
harm or postpone any measures by environmental organizations to counteract 
the effects.108 
The contrasting aptitudes of the district and circuit courts also affect the 
efficiency of the decisions.109 Whereas district courts are more competent to 
hear cases requiring fact-finding, circuit courts are more adept at reviewing a 
record.110 The administrative record produced by the agency involves the fac-
tual development that would occur at the district court level, and the judicial 
review of the rule relies on that previously established record.111 Because cir-
                                                                                                                           
 99 See Nat’l Cotton Council, 553 F.3d at 933. 
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cuit courts regularly review cases based on the lower court’s established rec-
ord, they have more experience and expertise with this kind of review.112 
Furthermore, diverging decisions by district courts would produce incon-
sistency that could hinder the effectiveness of the CWA.113 With inconsistent 
court decisions, regulators and the regulated community could be unsure of 
whether a particular action is lawful.114 The uncertainty created by these dif-
ferences could result in less enforcement of environmental regulations, as nei-
ther agencies nor the regulated community would know whether a regulation is 
enforceable until it is challenged in that particular district court.115 Limiting the 
forums for judicial review to the circuit courts could produce greater uniformi-
ty of decisions because there would be fewer total forums, and petitions origi-
nally filed with several circuit courts could be consolidated in one court.116 
CONCLUSION 
In Friends of the Everglades v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 
the Eleventh Circuit held that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear 
direct petitions challenging the EPA’s promulgation of the water transfer rule. 
Circuit courts have given the jurisdictional provision either a pragmatic or a 
plain meaning interpretation in determining which agency actions could be 
reviewed directly at the circuit court level. The Eleventh Circuit chose the 
plain meaning approach in holding that it did not have jurisdiction. Given the 
two distinct analyses applied by the circuit courts, a Supreme Court holding 
would have provided clarity for future interpretations of the jurisdictional pro-
visions of the Clean Water Act. Although both approaches could benefit the 
environment, a strictly plain meaning approach could present systemic envi-
ronmental challenges for the future. The pragmatic approach, in contrast, could 
improve efficiency, consistency, and regulatory certainty. 
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